SUPREME
COURT
2018 TERM
Case No. 2018-0483
CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS
Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
PAUL MARAVELIAS
Defendant-Appellant
RULE 7 MANDATORY APPEAL OF STALKING FINAL ORDER OF
PROTECTION
From 10th Circuit Court –
District Division – Derry
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
Submitted by Defendant,
Paul J.
Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305
ORAL ARGUMENT
REQUESTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. RSA
633:3-A, III-C. IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FACIALLY AND AS-APPLIED
A. The
“Safety and Well-Being” Language of 633:3-a, III-c. is Overbroad
i. The Statute Regulates and
Burdens Protected Speech
1. Maravelias’s 12/10/17 Email
to Mrs. Smith is Protected Speech
2. Maravelias’s 11/2/2017
Response to Attorney Brown is Protected Speech
3. The March 2017 Nasty Letter to David
DePamphilis
ii. The Statute Triggers Strict
Scrutiny
1. The Regulation is
Content-Based
2. The
Regulation Isolates Disfavored Speakers and is Not Viewpoint-Neutral
iii. The Statute Fails Even
Intermediate Scrutiny
2. The Governmental Interest
Served is not “Compelling”
B. The “Safety and Well-Being” Language of
633:3-a, III-c. is Impermissibly Vague
A. Good Cause for Stalking Order Extension was
Not Shown by a Preponderance of Evidence
IV. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MARAVELIAS’S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
i. “Obsession” and the 6/8/18
Surprise-Photographs-Exhibit
VI. THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR EXTENDED PROTECTIVE
ORDERS
A.The Trial Court Transgressed Constitutional Rights and
Unsustainably Exercised Discretion
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State
of New Hampshire
Appeal of Martino, 138 N.H. 612 (1994).......................................................... 52
Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t. of
Resources & Economic Dev., 163 N.H. 215,221 (2012) 32,
38
Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448,451,879 A.2d 1161
(2005)......................... 32
MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6,10 (2008)............................................ 40,
49
McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643,645 (2005)................................. 33, 51,
52
State v. Allard, 148 N.H. 702 A.2d 506,510 (2002)......................................... 38
State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. A.2d 1253 (2004)..................................................... 33
State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304,307 (2006)...................................... 31,
32, 33
State v. Porelle, 149 N.H. 420 (2003)................................................................ 33
State v. Zidel, 156 N.H. 684, 686 (2008)........................................................... 34
Stewart v. Murdock, (2015-0448)...................................................................... 42
Commomwealth
of Massachusetts
O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (2012)..................................................... 37
UNited States of America
American Legion Post 7 of Durham,
N.C. v. City of Durham,
239 F.3d 601,607 (4th Cir. 2001) 35
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal. 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).......................... 34, 38
Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312,322 (1988)............................................................ 35
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)................................................... 33
Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 130 S.
Ct. 882,883 (2010)..... 36, 37
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)........................................................... 34
Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (2014)................................................................... 38
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,540 (1989)................................................ 41
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,732 (2000)........................................................ 43
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 129 S.Ct. 1125,172
L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) 37
Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,74 (1990)........................................... 40
Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town
of Mendon, 769
F.3d 61,73 (1st Cir. 2014) 41,
42
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) 33
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2664 (2011)........................................... 36
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949)........................................ 35
Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622,658,114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994).......................................................................................................................... 37
Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989)....................................... 38
Constitutional Provisions
First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution................................. 32,
33, 34, 36
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution......................................... 32
New Hampshire Constitution Part I,
Article 22.......................................... 32,
38
Statutes
M.G.L. 258E §3(d).............................................................................................. 45
M.G.L. 265 §43................................................................................................... 45
RSA 173-B in genere.......................................................................................... 32
RSA 173-B:3........................................................................................................ 53
RSA 633:3-a in genere.................................................................................. 32,
42
RSA 633:3-a, III-a............................................................................ 38,
40, 41, 42
RSA 633:3-a, III-c....................................................................................... passim
RSA 641:5, I.(B).................................................................................................. 57
New Hampshire Rules of the Circuit
Court - District Division
Circuit Court Rule 1.4......................................................................................... 52
Academic Literature
Newberg and Waldman, 2012
(https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/words-can-change-your-brain/201208/the-most-dangerous-word-in-the-world)................................ 39
Rook, K.S. (1984)................................................................................................ 39
TEXT OF RELEVANT AUTHORITIES
RSA 173-B:3.................................................................................................................. A226
RSA 641:5...................................................................................................................... A227
M.G.L. 258E
§ 3............................................................................................................. A227
M.G.L. 265 §
43............................................................................................................. A227
New
Hampshire Court Rules
Circuit Court Rule 1.4.................................................................................................... A229
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Is RSA 633:3-a, III-c. constitutional?
(T302;A48,A50,A162-163,A99-100)[1]
2.
Was there sufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s finding that Christina DePamphilis had “reasonable
fear” of Maravelias?
(T307,471,478,479,485,486;A43,46,118)
3.
Did the trial court commit an unsustainable exercise
of discretion and/or an error of law in granting Plaintiff’s motion to extend
stalking order and/or her 7/2/18 post-trial motion for expanded protective
orders?
(A43,44,45,47,50,158,118,186)
4.
Did the trial court violate Respondent’s procedural
and/or substantive due process rights?
(T5-7,9:1-3,484:17-18,487-489;A48-50,63-65,111-114)
5.
Did Judge John J. Coughlin commit a rampant
pre-retirement spree of unjust conduct marked by hostile prejudicial bias
against Maravelias and reflexive, typhlotic rejection of all his arguments, quidquid sint?
(A45,51,115-126);
Plain-error; Supreme Court Justices as supervisory judges per Rule 54 and Code
of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.12 (B)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Overture
This appeal is a righteous young man’s exasperated plea for
justice. Maravelias apologizes in advance to this Honorable Court for wherever
he may fail in this legal brief to restrain his understandable righteous indignation.
He recites here a breviloquent case-summary with the bare minimum of necessary
facts, relegating further facts into the following section.
DePamphilis’s
December 2016 Delusions
In December 2016, David DePamphilis got angry with Paul
Maravelias. Paul had asked-out David’s daughter to dinner on 12/12/16. (T27,276-277)
Paul Maravelias never once spoke to or communicated with her ever after that
day. (T27,28,35-36,451:17-18) On 12/23/16, after 11 days of frightening,
harassing conduct by David DePamphilis discussed in the related case (2018-0376),
Maravelias texted David DePamphilis to “stop harassing [Maravelias’s] parents
please”. (A197) As a result of this text, David texted Paul’s parents the same
night, promising, “that’s the last straw”. (A186,198) Five days thereafter, on
12/28/16, Maravelias was served a Stalking Temporary Order of Protection. But DePamphilis’s
daughter Christina, nominally, had filed a “stalking petition” against
Maravelias (473-2016-CV-124). Maravelias hadn’t interacted with her once since
12/12/16 weeks prior (T226:15,27,28,35-36,451:17-18), the first and only time Maravelias
expressed an interest in her.
The Legal Abuse Begins
Outraged, Maravelias expedited the hearing and boldly
appeared pro se as a legally
untrained, falsely accused 21-year-old college student. (T64) His innocence and
rhetorical skills were no match for the polished legal scheming of Jerome
Blanchard, DePamphilis’s first attorney-henchman.
Tyrant
I: Robert S. Stephen
The DePamphilis actors got their stalking order on 2/7/17. It
was Judge Robert S. Stephen
who granted this stalking petition against a dignified and level-headed
gentleman named Paul Maravelias. (A40)
The Censored Exculpatory Audio Recording
Maravelias happened to have a sentimental audio recording of
his 12/12/16 dinner-date-proposal exchange, proving his gentlemanly verbal appropriateness.
(T276;A98) After Christina DePamphilis lied under oath
about what Maravelias had said, to make him sound like a “creepy” or socially
deficient person, Maravelias was disallowed to play his exculpatory recording
in court. (T277) Robert S. Stephen defied Maravelias’s every vociferous assertion
to the contrary, falsely claiming in his Orwellian Order that Maravelias had
mentioned the “age of consent” while asking-out David’s 16-year-old daughter!
(A40)
The
First Arrest
David DePamphilis complained to the police about Maravelias’s
suppressed recording after abusing Maravelias with a falsified restraining
order. Robert S. Stephen approved search warrants and Windham PD raided
Maravelias’s Windham home and Dartmouth dorm room on 4/6/17, whisking-away all
Maravelias’s digital property in toto
(cellphones, PCs, USB-drives, etc). The police-state arrested
Maravelias on 6/13/17 for “wiretapping” (RSA 570-A): the crime of pressing a
button on your smartphone outdoors to voice record yourself the first
time you ask out a girl in your life, with the intention of sharing it with her,
and later wanting to play it to disprove contemptible false accusations. (T43,443)
The
Futile Appeal
Maravelias was an economics major and a bright kid. But, he had
no idea what “issue preservation” was. He didn’t know he had 10 days to preserve
legal arguments in a motion for reconsideration. (T63:25) Once he hired a
top-notch attorney to appeal the ridiculous stalking order (2017-139), it was
apparently too late. This Court was compelled to affirm, declining to review
the appeal’s substance because its arguments were unpreserved.
The
Second Arrest
Maravelias emailed his beloved Windham High School mentor and
civics teacher, Mrs. Smith, on 12/10/17. (A91) Alas: Mrs. Smith runs the WHS National
Honor Society chapter. Maravelias attached evidence of Christina DePamphilis’s legal
falsification and substance-abuse crimes, which disqualify her from ongoing NHS
membership. (T419;A91-92) Now Greg Iworsky,
the WHS WPD resource officer, had married Heather Newell, WPD’s prosecutor. Heather
and another small, third-rate WPD officer-tyrant caught wind of Maravelias’s private
email to a public employee. They pleasured themselves by arresting Maravelias
on 12/15/17 for “stalking” DePamphilis’s daughter, whom Maravelias hadn’t seen
for almost a year nor knew even still existed. (T331,336-337)
They threw Maravelias in jail, purposely on a Friday night.
Maravelias had just bought his family a Christmas tree and was planning to
decorate it with his two siblings. An obese fat-acceptance-feminist nurse at
Rockingham County Jail forced Maravelias into solitary confinement after he
politely mentioned he’d be doing a three-day fast until the Monday arraignment,
so the jail didn’t need to waste food he wouldn’t eat. Rapists and murderers inside
the same jail enjoyed a bed to sleep on that night. Heather Iworsky
vitriolically slandered Maravelias at arraignment before Tyrant I. They held
the bizarre, illogical charge over Maravelias for as long as they could,
dropping it months thereafter in late May 2018. (T331,337,384:9-12;A37)
The
Extension
After repeated mid-order acts of cruel bullying, harassment,
and indeed stalking against Paul Maravelias (T278-280,299,307) (see also 2018-0376), the relentless DePamphilis
actors motioned the court on 1/5/18 to extend their precious “stalking order”
another year to February 2019. (A72) Judge Sharon DeVries granted the
preliminary extension on 1/12/18. (A10) The trial court scheduled a hearing for
2/15/18 on Maravelias’s objection thereto, 34 days after 1/12/18, and actually gave Maravelias his first opportunity to proceed with
the hearing on 2/20/18. (A222,151)
Tyrant
II: John J. Coughlin
There was
in those days a judge named John J. Coughlin.
Now John was presiding at Derry, fulfilling the last-days of
his career: for the extension case was transferred thither from Salem after
Judge Stephen’s recusal. A three-day hearing commenced 5/3/18 and finished
6/8/18. Judge John J. Coughlin
granted the stalking order extension on 6/15/18. (A1)
Coughlin’s
Career-Capstone Summer 2018 Orders against Maravelias
It came to pass that John J. Coughlin authored a
written finding with said Order. (A2) Before retiring on 9/5/18, Judge Coughlin
also granted DePamphilis’s post-trial motion requesting even more severe
restrictions on Maravelias’s public free-speech rights (A7), terrified that Maravelias
could expose the character of David DePamphilis’s perjuring (T275:25,370;A21,24,28,189,192,201),
substance-abusing (T60,364,371-372,418,450;A18,84,167), bullying (T299:3,301:13,307:2-4,339,346-347,371,476,483;A11,13,43,118),
harassing (T164:21, T299:3,482:25,485;A43,49,91), stalking (T70:10;A61-62,166),
physically unrecognizable (T353-355;A46¶20), lying (T275:25,340:21,368:12,483:25;A62,91,187,189),
law-breaking (T421:18,A167-196), “independent” (T74:14,233:8) daughter
Christina.
This appeal follows.
STATEMENT
OF FACTS
David DePamphilis begat a daughter in 2000: Christina
DePamphilis (“Plaintiff-Appellee”), a high school senior turning 18 in a few
days.
Paul Maravelias (“Defendant-Appellant”) is a 23-year-old
author and recent college graduate who is presently employed as a software
engineer. (A42) He’s had an unusual experience stemming from the first time he
ever asked a girl on a date. Maravelias does not drink alcohol, consume illegal
drugs, or commit perjury to abuse those who showed him kindness and respect. (A43)
He believes he differs from Christina DePamphilis in these regards. (A43)
Social
Pretext to December 2016
Both parties are Windham residents and were good friends
before David DePamphilis’s direful December 2016 devolution into the legal
abuser of Paul Maravelias. (T274,275;A98,102) David
and his daughter came to Maravelias’s house on 6/18/2016 for a family party. (T275:24,276)
David was “smoking cigars” with Maravelias’s dad (T38,39): this was the last
time Maravelias saw Christina DePamphilis prior to the 12/12/16 dinner-invitation.
During cross-examination, Christina struggled to justify her coming over Paul’s
house mere months before calling him a “stalker” with dramatic retellings of being
“scared” by him since 2013. (T39)
The
December 2016 Origin of the Stalking Petition
Maravelias needs not belabor the details of his 12/12/16 birthday-exchange
with DePamphilis’s daughter, by now reviewed ad nauseum in both appellate cases. According to laborious design,
Maravelias invited her to dinner with an outlandish sports-car, which she said
was “very sweet”.[2] (A98) But DePamphilis’s
wife clarified her daughter perceived Maravelias as “a nice friend”. He left
once rejected, saying, “I respect your feelings” and “have a beautiful
Christmas”. (T278:4;A98) There was not a hint of
impropriety, the slightest indication the daughter felt “scared”, nor the most
remote semblance of “stalking” whatsoever. (A98,31) In fact, Christina
DePamphilis had invited Maravelias back to her house on 12/12/16 for
this interaction, after he first came to the door and her mommy was in the
shower. (T157:21-158:12;A31) Maravelias, ever the
gentleman, awaited Mrs. DePamphilis.
Nor does Maravelias re-explain the history of David
DePamphilis’s subsequent December 2016 course of explosive, threatening,
harassing, profane, and frightening conduct against him and his parents –
likewise detailed in the related appeal (See
2018-0376).
The undeniable fact is Paul Maravelias had a normal family friends relationship to Christina DePamphilis (T275) and
transitory romantic attraction which manifested in a cute birthday dinner date
proposal and ostentatious stunt with a fancy car. The undeniable fact is “she”
filed a stalking petition 16 days after Maravelias’s final contact with her, after
her father was angered by Maravelias’s challenging David DePamphilis’s emotionally
and verbally abusive antagonism.
Foolhardy
Falsity: The Original Stalking Petition
The stalking petition dreamed up a host of absurd, malicious
dramatizations of history against Maravelias. He was falsely accused of having
“grabbed [her] arm” at “cheer practice” three years prior in 2013 (A150). It is
telling that even in David’s December 2016 telephonic tirades, where he accused
Maravelias to his face of everything short of raping the Sabine women, David
never mentioned this alleged “arm-grabbing” incident with his daughter nor the
word “stalking” whatsoever.
Appellant bores-not this Court by reviewing similar
defamatory drivel from DePamphilis’s original stalking petition. A neurotic
admixture of [paraphrasing] “I think he hacked into my Twitter account” (T174:13),
“he was looking at me in his backyard” (T185:11), “he tried to talk to me at
the Turkey Trot once and I was scared” (A39) and similar cringeworthy
absurdities sustained the witch-hunt against Maravelias, an innocent suitor.
Judge
Robert S. Stephen Slanders Maravelias a “Stalker”
On 2/7/17, Judge Robert
S. Stephen confirmed once-more the reputation he had already earned
himself within the New Hampshire legal community is deserved. Stephen granted
the stalking petition, issuing an Order against Maravelias scribbled in
barely-legible chicken-scratching penmanship. (A40) Judge Stephen opened his Order
accusing that the “Defendant has been obsessed with the Defendant”. (A40)
After failing to remember way back from law school the word
“Plaintiff”, Judge Stephen accused Maravelias’s stalking course of conduct was
based in two acts: that Maravelias
1) “drove [David’s
daughter] home and attempted to drop the other person off first” in 2013, and
2) “waited until she
turned 16 which he referred to as the ‘age of consent’ to her mother, offered [sic] her a brand new mazzaretti
[sic]”. (A40)
Paul
Maravelias humbly demands this Court and anyone reading this document meditate upon
the disturbing fact that the above two reasons are why a New Hampshire family
court judge labeled Maravelias a “stalker”.
In recklessly libeling Maravelias, Judge Stephen only memorialized
his own incompetence: in 2013, David DePamphilis himself had asked Paul
Maravelias to give his daughter a ride home from a restaurant they were at, as
a favor. (T286:21-13) If Paul Maravelias had truly been perceived as a
“stalker”, David DePamphilis would not have explicitly consigned his own daughter
into Maravelias’s vehicle, volunteering Maravelias to serve as Mr. DePamphilis’s
own filial spedizione chauffeur! (T287)
Secondly, Maravelias never “referred” to the young
woman’s birthday as her “age of consent”. (T101:20,370:11,484:5,484:12,487:4;A29,31,98,106,192)
Only a perverse tyrant fully divorced from the most elementary tenets of
justice would dare to judicially shove words into a good young man’s mouth[3] never
spoken, which said-young-man categorically denied ever speaking (T101:20,370:11,484:5,484:12,487:4), and
for which he assertively offered indisputable physical evidence (his audio recording) as proof. Maravelias lawfully
played this audio recording for his parents on 10/21/17 in Vermont; they
testified in letters to the contents: that Maravelias never once said anything
remotely close to the disturbing “age of consent” comment DePamphilis falsely
accused. (A28-32) Further, the lie that Maravelias had said this appeared nowhere
in the stalking petition. (T489:14,491:6,492:7) A stalking order thus exists
against Maravelias because of a disprovable lie that wasn’t even noticed in the
petition.
Hypocrisy
and Harassment: Christina DePamphilis’s Middle-Finger Post Against Maravelias with
her New 21-Year-Old Boyfriend
Having secured their falsified restraining order, the savage
DePamphilis actors escalated their psychological terrorism against Paul Maravelias
to a new level. On 6/19/17, Christina posted a picture on her public social-media
showing her new college-age boyfriend Matthew LaLiberte
making challenging comments against “P M”. (T79-82;A13)
Then, on 6/21/17 at 9:13pm, she posted a picture showing
David DePamphilis, herself, and her boyfriend standing together and
middle-fingering the camera, with the caption, “Did Dartmouth teach you how to
do this? [middle-finger emoji]” (T69,70,72-77;A11),
which she confessed was obviously targeted at Maravelias. (T74,76) This was
days after she got Maravelias arrested on 6/13/17 for trying to defend himself
against her false stalking accusations with his censored cell-phone voice
recording. (T349) She and her father were rubbing-in the all their legal abuse
while taunting Maravelias with Christina’s new 21-year-old (T146,147) boyfriend
– Maravelias’s age – endeavoring to create an even more provocative aspect of jealousy.
(T476)
Weeks prior, Christina DePamphilis had whined under-oath she
was “scared” of Maravelias and “afraid” “to set him off” – that “it’s like
walking on eggshells with him” (T67:10-11) – to get the stalking order she
later unsuccessfully baited him into violating. (T232:10-13)
Christina
DePamphilis’s “Tipsytina69” Activities: A Rare Flash of Honesty
In summer 2017, outraged female entities within the campus of
Windham youth supplied Maravelias with Christina DePamphilis’s postings on her
legally-public Instagram account she named “tipsytina69”, a reference to
drunken oral intercourse. (T239:16,359) These exhibits were referenced frequently
at hearing. They showed Christina DePamphilis was quite beyond her green-age of
16 years: she would alcoholically (T60,364;A18,167) and narcotically (T450:21;A167)
intoxicate herself, and brag about how far she and her 21-year-old boyfriend would
displace the bed during sexual intercourse, whereupon Christina visually
emphasized in red ink that the intercourse kinetically translated their bed over
two feet from the wall. (A221,159) Maravelias argued these posts contradicted
the deceptive “young-and-innocent” optics DePamphilis had falsely conjured
against Maravelias to win a “stalking” order, that they undermine her dubious professions
of “fear”, and that great irony exists in light of
older-Maravelias’s comparatively rectitudinous lifestyle.
Liar
Caught Red-Handed: Maravelias’s May 2018 Cross-Examination of Christina
DePamphilis
Maravelias cross-examined DePamphilis at the 5/3/18 and
5/4/18 hearings.
On 5/3/18, Christina DePamphilis confessed that Maravelias
has never attempted to interact with her since December 2016. (T27:18)
Maravelias asked, “Please tell this Court the last time you were stalked by
me.” (T28:18-19) Christina memorably responded, “I continue to being [sic]
stalked every day.” (T28:20)
Christina said she believes Maravelias making any in-public comment
she would consider defamatory is an instance of “stalking” her. (T34) When asked
how she could possibly sustain her burden that Maravelias “threat[ens]” her “personal safety”, she responded: “You just don’t
stop… [pause] you continue to… [pause] to send letters threatening to
ruin my career”, referencing Maravelias’s single November 2017 reply to David
DePamphilis’s outrageous legal bluff-threat letter to Maravelias. (T46:22-24)
Paul Maravelias asked Christina DePamphilis: “Isn’t there a
difference between stalking, and people speaking their free minds about your
actions and accusations against them?” (T57:16-18) Christina slipped and tellingly
replied, “you can’t do that when I have a stalking order against you.” (T57:19-20)
Christina clarified Maravelias’s third-party self-defensive speech-acts
disagreeing with her stalking accusations are themselves further acts
“stalking”, because he is “further talking about me [her]”. (T58)
Maravelias challenged David DePamphilis’s daughter to name one
single incident he had actually stalked her. (T59)
She replied, “such as my eighth-grade graduation”. (T59:14) Maravelias then
asked if she considered his “casually coming up to [her] [at Maravelias’s sibling’s graduation] and saying ‘hey,
congratulations’” in 2015 to be “stalking”. Christina DePamphilis failed to
answer the question; she turned to the Court and defeatedly opined, “he has a
way of misinterpretating [sic] situations”. (T59:17)
Christina DePamphilis lied multiple times: e.g., she first claimed she “was the
only one” “who knew” her harassing 6/21/17 middle-fingers post was directed at
Maravelias. (T72:16-17) Later, she admitted she “and [her] [five-years-older]
boyfriend” also knew. (T79:23-24) Another lie about the post was noted:
initially, she claimed it was just to “let [Maravelias] know” that she knew he
was viewing her page. (T70:15) Then Maravelias pulled-out her 6/19/17 post
which had already identified him. (T77:12-14,79:3-7,79:21-24)
Some of Christina DePamphilis’s vile lies were exposed spectacularly.
Maravelias played a cell-phone video for the trial court his younger sister
happened to be taking at the 11/28/2013 Windham Turkey Trot walk-run event.
Christina had alleged in her stalking petition and while testifying that
Maravelias “came up to her” at this event and “tried to talk to [her]”, making
her “scared”. (T220:3-9;A38,39) Coincidentally, the video captured this whole interaction[4]:
Christina DePamphilis had actually noticed Maravelias from across the crowd
along with his sister, walked over to him with a premeditated intention
to find him shared by Maravelias’s sister (T215:15-17, Video 0:47-1:24), and interrupted
Maravelias’s conversation with his friends, assertively exclaiming “Hi Paul!” (Video
at 1:24) Christina was even wearing a sweatshirt with the name of Maravelias’s
college on it and tried to win his approval by boasting, “I’m promoting your
college!” (Video at 1:28) Yet in her petition, this whole exchange was
dramatized into a delusional canard of Maravelias
“stalking” DePamphilis! (A39)
Christina
DePamphilis’s Inaffidable Imaginations
In a frantic scurry of subsequent damage-control, Christina
DePamphilis further evidenced her lack of credibility – whether from lying or deficient
memory. She asserted Maravelias’s sister had said the words “will you come see
him with me” in the video she’d just watched. (T222) Maravelias corrected her,
since his sister never spoke those words (Video at 0:47), but Christina
DePamphilis was so confident in her false, revisionist memory that she
challenged Maravelias, “you can replay it”. (T223) Maravelias later argued that
if she could “so extraordinarily contort and misremember something that she
observed five minutes prior, imagine, just imagine [her stalking accusations
from up to] three years prior”. (T343:1-9)
The telling Turkey Trot video elicited another indication of
the teenage-girl-Plaintiff’s capacity for creative, reconstructive memory – the
component of her falsity not begotten
of willful lying. She was convicted Maravelias had mentioned somewhere in the
record he “had a friend” take the 2013 Turkey-Trot video, which his sister
incidentally happened to take. (T218,219) Maravelias later reminded he’d never
said anything like this anywhere, despite Christina DePamphilis’s steadfast
certainty otherwise. (T341,342) That Christina DePamphilis testified falsely to
a highly specific representation while firmly convicted of the truth thereof will
be undeniable when she inevitably fails in her opposing brief to cite where in
the “transcripts” Maravelias said that which she had a vivid though false
memory of him saying. (T219)
Christina DePamphilis also testified she “has suspicions”
Maravelias “flew a remote-controlled surveillance drone” to her “bedroom
window” during the stalking order. (T171) Her basis was that, one night, she
“was seeing lights in [her] window” around “12:30” (T171), but when she “would
open the window … nothing was there” (T172). She believed since Maravelias “was
the valedictorian” and “went to an Ivy League school” he could have been
“smart” enough to do this (T173,175), although she never saw any such flying
device (T181). She also checked to ensure Maravelias had not installed “very
microscopic” “hidden cameras” in her bedroom. (T194)
Motion to Extend Allegation
#1: Maravelias Was Mean on 11/2/17 in Replying to Attorney Brown’s Threatening Letter
DePamphilis’s Motion to Extend the stalking order accurately alleged
Maravelias had made offensive communications to third-parties. (A72) In
replying to an outrageous legal threat by David DePamphilis, Maravelias had responded
to Attorney Brown that Christina was an “ugly and disreputable whore”. (T409;A48,89) Deterring a lawsuit, Maravelias asserted his
right to publicize Christina’s social-media-documented acts of lawlessness,
which could “ruin her academic and professional career”, if David sued him.
Despite DePamphilis further “pursuing Maravelias legally”, Maravelias never
followed-through with the lawful retaliation he mentioned only when provoked by
DePamphilis’s threatening letter. (T415:7)
Motion
to Extend Allegation #2: Maravelias Wrote a Private Email to His Own WHS
Teacher
As mentioned supra,
Maravelias emailed on 12/10/17 his close mentor, Mrs. Smith, who runs the NHS
chapter. (A91) Maravelias CC’d three others of his
close mentors; he did not communicate to the Plaintiff, nor to any of
her friends or family members. (A91)
Motion
to Extend Allegation #3: Maravelias Had Communications with the Author of a Nasty
Letter Sent to David DePamphilis in March 2017
Maravelias did not write the nasty March 2017 letter but
“knew about it”. (T393;A17) A “girl from Windham”
wrote David DePamphilis the letter, purporting to be a “friend” of Maravelias.
(A76) The author attacked David DePamphilis for legally abusing Maravelias. (A76)
In Maravelias’s impolite 11/2/17 response letter to Attorney Brown, Maravelias corrected
DePamphilis’s false speculation that Maravelias was the author of the March
2017 letter:
“Unlike the
author, I had known in March that David’s wild daughter had already been fucked
raw by the man in secret at David’s beach house in February, days before her ‘confirmation
mass’ at my church.” (A88)
In responding to Attorney Brown’s vexatious legal threat,
Maravelias’s words were unwise and regrettably blunt. However, they were both truthful
and notable in proving Maravelias did not write the nasty March letter – the
author of which forewarned of a potential
sexual relationship as an overarching theme of her letter. I.e., the author was ignorant of what was happening between
DePamphilis’s barely-16-year-old daughter and her college-age boyfriend. If
Maravelias had written this letter, surely he would
have alluded to this salacious gossip of which the author was apparently
unaware.
Maravelias’s
Self-Defense in the Extension Hearing
Maravelias elucidated that none the motion-to-extend accusations,
true or false, pertained to “stalking” the Plaintiff. (T476) Maravelias
testified a confirmed trial-court-level clerical error had given him the false impression
the stalking order had been vacated, during which time Maravelias did not
contact the Plaintiff whatsoever. (T475) Maravelias had filed two trial-court
motions: 1) a wrongly-denied motion for discovery (A110), and 2) a motion to
dismiss (A107), given the original order’s basis upon an unnoticed allegation, arguing
that due-process is again violated by extending such an order. Judge Coughlin
utterly ignored the motion to dismiss; he never issued a ruling on it
whatsoever, nor addressed its legal arguments anywhere. (A49-50)
Judge
John J. Coughlin’s Orders
On 6/15/18, after hearing all the facts propounded
hereinabove, John Coughlin composed an Order extending the stalking order. The
full libel-text of Judge Coughlin’s emetic judicial terrorism is appended. (A2)
Then DePamphilis motioned for extremified injunctive terms against Maravelias on
7/2/18. (A152) John Coughlin predictably scribbled-off his seven-word approval.
(A7) Ostensibly insulted by Maravelias’s ten-page Motion for Reconsideration,
John Coughlin scribbled “denied” and retired on 9/5/18. (A3)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Where the continued stalking order is birthed of
unconstitutional law, abuse of discretion, revisionist memory, criminal
falsification, violation of due process, and judicial misconduct (A115), Judge Coughlin’s
2018 Orders should be vacated, and the entire original stalking order
retroactively annulled ab initio.
Maravelias should get his freedom and reputation back. Between
the parties, finally, should be peace.
ARGUMENT
I.
RSA 633:3-A, III-C. IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FACIALLY AND
AS-APPLIED
Questions of constitutional law receive de novo review. State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304,307 (2006).
A. The “Safety
and Well-Being” Language of 633:3-a, III-c. is Overbroad
RSA 633:3-a provides at III-c.,
“Any order …
may be extended by order of the court upon a motion by the plaintiff, showing
good cause, with notice to the defendant, for one year after the expiration of
the first order and thereafter each extension may be for up to 5 years, upon
the request of the plaintiff and at the discretion of the court. The court
shall review the order, and each renewal thereof and shall grant such relief as
may be necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff. …”
Here, the statute can be reasonably interpreted to permit
extension upon a showing of “good-cause” that a plaintiff’s “well-being” primarily
would be jeopardized without extending the protective order, even if concern
for “safety” is minimal. Any other reading is impossibly tautological, as a threat
to an individual’s “safety” is also a threat to their “well-being”. The legislature
could have omitted the word “well-being”, but intentionally appended it after
“safety”.
Neither RSA 633:3-a nor RSA 173-B define the term “well-being”; thus, dictionary
reference is appropriate. See Doyle
v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t. of Resources & Economic Dev., 163 N.H. 215,221
(2012). On review, this Court
ascribes “the plain and ordinary meaning to regulatory text”. Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448,451,879 A.2d
1161 (2005). The Oxford English
Dictionary defines “well-being” as “the state of being comfortable, healthy or
happy.”[5]
Insofar as the trial court found Maravelias’s specifics acts
of speech jeopardized the comfort, health, or happiness (“well-being”) or “safety”
of the Plaintiff and therefore granted the extension, the statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
constitution and Part I, Article 22 of the state constitution, as-applied and,
concerning the “fundamental right” of free speech, facially. See MacElman
at 307.
i.
The Statute Regulates and Burdens Protected Speech
By operation of the “safety and well-being” language of 633:3-a, III-c., the trial
court extended a stalking order on the basis of Maravelias’s acts of speech.
Since civil stalking orders criminalize possession of firearms and prohibit defendants
from communicating directly or indirectly to plaintiffs, the statute restricts
constitutional rights. Further, the stalking statute “implicates the
fundamental right to freedom of movement”. State v. Porelle,
149 N.H. 420 (2003). “It hardly bears
mentioning that a restraining order restrains one’s liberty ... from a number
of legal activities.” McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643,645 (2005). In Maravelias’s case, the
extended stalking order criminalizes appearing at his own and his sister’s high
school, as well as his legitimate automobile passage through one of only two
roads connecting his Windham neighborhood to the outer world. Though not a
criminal prohibition, the stalking statute undeniably burdened the exercise of Maravelias’s
lawful speech through a civil restraining order extension resultant of his
lawful speech, as it does in general for all such defendants.
The ambit of the federal First Amendment surpasses categorical prohibitions and extends
to such “statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First
Amendment rights.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Cf. State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. A.2d
1253 (2004) at 422-425, applying the same under the state
constitution. In New Hampshire, “a statute is void for overbreadth if it
attempts to control conduct by means which invade areas of protected freedom.” MacElman at 310. In the context of
lawful-speech-related stalking order extension, 633:3-a, III-c. burdens the exercise of protected freedoms. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), invalidating a law which imposed
merely a “financial disincentive” to certain speech, let alone a stalking order
as incapacitating as the one against Maravelias.
Here, the regulated speech is protected. Since
constitutionally protected, non-threatening speech to third-parties permits
extension under the statute, the statute is overbroad. Facially, the overbroad
language of the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s
interest in effecting the cessation of stalking, discussed infra. As applied, Maravelias’s three acts cited by the trial court
and noticed in Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend are protected, legitimate, lawful
speech.
1.
Maravelias’s 12/10/17 Email to Mrs. Smith is Protected Speech
An email to a public employee expressing a viewpoint
that alleged criminal actions disqualify a person from said public employee’s
honor society does not fall into any of the recognized exceptions to
constitutionally protected speech. “As a general principle, the First Amendment
bars the government from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear.” Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coal. 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002); see also State v. Zidel, 156 N.H.
684, 686 (2008). Maravelias’s email –
specifically requesting that it not be shared with the Plaintiff – does not
fall into any recognized First-Amendment exception, such as “violence”-incitation or
“obscenity”. Ashcroft at 245; Zidel at
686.
2.
Maravelias’s 11/2/2017 Response to Attorney Brown is Protected Speech
Maravelias’s private responsive communication to
Attorney Brown advancing a deterrent legal counterthreat does not constitute
any form of unprotected speech. While Maravelias incorporated a few scattered
profanities, this does not come close to “obscene” speech. Cf. Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), holding the phrase “fuck the draft” displayed inside a courthouse as protected.
“A function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger.” Terminiello
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949).
3.
The March 2017 Nasty Letter to David DePamphilis
Maravelias did not write the letter (See supra). It was not sent to the Plaintiff. (T14) Maravelias’s
private verbal communications with the letter’s author are protected. Further,
the letter itself does not contain any obscene content nor fighting-words; it is
protected speech regardless of authorship. The US Supreme Court has noted that
“citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to
provide adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment.” Boos v. Berry, 485
U.S. 312,322 (1988).
ii.
The Statute Triggers Strict Scrutiny
“The amount of burden on speech needed to trigger
First Amendment scrutiny as a threshold matter is minimal.” American Legion
Post 7 of Durham, N.C. v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601,607 (4th
Cir. 2001). Here,
Maravelias’s constitutional rights are manifoldly restricted because of lawful
speech. This far-exceeds the threshold of triggering constitutional scrutiny. As
the statute implicates “fundamental rights”, intermediate scrutiny in-the-least
applies. Further, strict scrutiny is the only valid form review here, since
633:3-a, III-c. is content-based, discriminatory against a
disfavored group, and not viewpoint-neutral.
1.
The Regulation is Content-Based
“The First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever
the government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.’” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2664 (2011). “The First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which may be
a means to control content.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
130 S. Ct. 882,883 (2010).
Facially, that the statute invites courts to evaluate whether
a defendant’s public or third-party speech-acts undermine a plaintiff’s
“happiness” or “comfort” (“well-being”), and is therefore content-based, is
plain. Here, if Maravelias had responded to Attorney Brown on 11/2/17 saying, “in
parting ways, I respect David’s daughter”, doubtlessly the response would not
have been used against Maravelias. Likewise, if Maravelias’s 12/10/17 email to
Mrs. Smith had been a generic salutation email mentioning, “I have some legal problems
with Ms. DePamphilis, but she’s still a great person”, then the ridiculous
accusation of “following-up” on a “threat” within WPD’s baseless charge could
not have existed (A37); the email would be irrelevant to extension.
Therefore, the regulation is content-based, triggering strict
scrutiny.
2.
The Regulation Isolates Disfavored Speakers and is Not
Viewpoint-Neutral
The regulation’s lack of content-neutrality closely
resembles its lack of viewpoint-neutrality. Whereas Christina DePamphilis’s obscene,
incitative (unprotected[6])
middle-finger post (A11) directed to
Maravelias entitled Maravelias to no recourse under the statute, the same
statute permitted Maravelias’s non-incitative-nor-obscene
(protected) speech in public or to third-parties to motivate stalking order
extension. Moreover, the statute’s viewpoint-discrimination afflicts a certain
group (stalking order defendants) doubtlessly “disfavored” by society. See Citizens United, ibid., applying strict-scrutiny review to
laws that “disfavors specific speakers”. See
also Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,658,114 S.Ct.
2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). “Speaker-based laws demand
strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s ... aversion to what the
disfavored speakers have to say”. Id.
3.
Forum Analysis
Maravelias’s 12/10/17 communication to Mrs. Smith’s public
high-school email account commands further protection as speech within a
“nonpublic forum” or, arguably, “limited public forum”. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 129 S.Ct. 1125,172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). Even in a nonpublic forum,
lack of viewpoint-neutrality triggers strict scrutiny.
Because the “State Constitution provides at least as much
protection as the Federal Constitution”, strict-scrutiny-review is appropriate
under both corpora of law. State v. Allard, 148 N.H. 702 A.2d 506,510
(2002).
iii.
The Statute Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny
Even content-neutral regulations subject to intermediate
scrutiny must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information”. Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (2014), citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989). A statute
fails intermediate scrutiny if burdening “substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests”. Ward at 799. Applying strict scrutiny, the
governmental interest advanced must be not only “significant”, but “compelling”.
1.
Tailoring Analysis
Where the statute’s standard for stalking order extension atrociously
exceeds the government’s presumed interest in the “cessation of stalking” (See RSA 633:3-a, III-a.), it is overinclusively
not-narrowly-tailored. Although arguably intending to regulate unprotected (e.g., threatening) speech, “the
overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech
if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the
process.” Ashcroft at 237. See
also Doyle at 221, invalidating laws as facially overbroad
under Part I, Article 22 of the State Constitution where “a substantial
number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the
[law’s] plainly legitimate sweep”.
RSA 633:3-a, III-c. permits trial courts to extend any stalking
order where a plaintiff testifies she’d feel “uncomfortable” or “unhappy”
otherwise, since this alone shows by “good-cause” that an extension would “provide
for” her “state of being comfortable, happy, or healthy” (the
definition of “well-being”, supra). The
language renders the facts of the case – a defendant’s history of stalking, the
level of expected unlawful future behavior, etc. – completely irrelevant where
a plaintiff’s mere “comfort” or “happiness” is served by granting extension.
The draconian statute disowns any realistic model of human
psychology or sociology, in which one person’s lawful third-party-or-public
expressions might incidentally distress an individual holding different views –
even though the suppression of minor
annoyance alone triggers the dictionary definition of serving “well-being”.
Negative social experiences disfavor well-being. Rook, K.S. (1984)[7]
Seeing the word “no” alone triggers unhealthy, uncomfortable, and unhappy
neurotransmitters and hormones.[8]
The statute burdens a woefully latitudinous fetch of
protected speech far beyond that necessary to promote “a cessation of stalking”.
A potential rebuttal pits the controlling context of “safety” and the generic
context of the statute against “well-being” as altogether constituting a legal
standard for extension higher than prevention of minor annoyance. But, such an interpretation
is tautologically illogical, since the legislature added the word “well-being”
and, thus, intently did not stop at “safety”. Regardless, such a reading would
separately demonstrate the statute’s unacceptable vagueness, discussed infra.
Separately, reasonable alternatives to the “safety and
well-being” language which would equally advance the counter-stalking governmental-interest
evince the statute’s lack of narrow-tailoring. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,74 (1990). The statute could
alternatively permit stalking order extension upon a good-cause-showing such
would provide for a plaintiff’s “safety” only, or, better-yet, “as is necessary
to bring about a cessation of” (or simply “prevent”) “stalking”, to mirror the
language in subsection III-a. No possible circumstance
currently allowing extension would fail this more-narrowly-tailored test wherein
the governmental-interest involved is truly one of counter-stalking, rather than of silencing annoying speech and effectively criminalizing a defendant’s
self-defensive speech itself caused by the stalking order, as in Maravelias’s
case. Such a narrowly-tailored alternative would not amount to the necessity
of re-proving new acts of stalking or showing protective-order non-compliance to
obtain extension, since the “good-cause” standard already requires that the trial court consider the underlying
circumstantial provenance of the original stalking-order. See MacPherson v. Weiner, 158
N.H. 6,10 (2008).
Rather, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. surreptitiously supplants the
original-stalking-order legal standard (III-a) with a patently absurd
legal standard catering to “well-being” (III-c.), unrelated to the narrow counter-stalking
governmental-interest, when extension is concerned. Naturally, therefore, the
statute is also underinclusively
not-narrowly-tailored. Statutes failing
to restrict an amount of harmful-to-the-governmental-interest speech comparable
to the amount restricted are not narrowly-tailored. See Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d
61,73 (1st Cir. 2014); Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524,540 (1989). Here, if “safety and
well-being” actually is otherwise narrowly-tailored to serve the
governmental-interest, then so should the initial-stalking-order-issuance legal
standard of III-a adopt the lower good-cause-provision-for-“safety
and well-being” standard, rather than the higher-burden, more-stringent
standard currently within subsection III-a positively requiring “stalking” and
granting relief only as necessary “to bring about a cessation” thereof.
Instead, the illogical “safety and well-being” conundrum at III-c. radically discriminates between groups of
potentially indifferentiable stalking order defendants. III-c. assaults the
liberty-interests of extant defendants through a much-lower “well-being” legal
standard, while III-a coddles the liberty-interests of new defendants, even
though the liberty-restricting nature of the one-year injunction-at-hand remains
identical both at III-a and III-c. Though civil, this villainously contravenes
the precepts of double-jeopardy. In fact, III-c. permits further extensions “for up to 5
years”, despite imposing a far lower legal standard than III-a!
In failing to be narrowly-tailored, the statute also
discriminates against stalking victims.
Why should the State expect legitimate stalking victims newly-seeking
protective injunction to sustain a much higher burden than those already
granted a stalking order – for the same one-year protection? If any difference
in legal standard is appropriate between the two groups, equity requires the reverse.
This concern is exacerbated by New Hampshire trial courts’ “extending” stalking
orders by III-c. – lawfully or unlawfully – months after their
expiration. See Stewart v. Murdock,
(2015-0448). The overbroad language at III-c. creates an inequitable advantage for
prior-order-wielding plaintiffs and an indefensible disadvantage for
prior-order-subject defendants.
2.
The Governmental Interest Served is not “Compelling”
The underinclusiveness aforementioned casts doubt on
whether the statute’s “proffered interest is truly forwarded by the regulation, or is in fact substantial enough to warrant such
regulation.” Showtime Entertainment, LLC, supra. That is, if the “safety and
well-being” standard were narrowly-tailored to the interest, the interest would
be compelling enough to warrant usage of the same legal standard for
original-stalking-order-issuance at subsection III-a. This suggests the governmental-interest
served is not “compelling”, forming separate causal grounds for failure of
strict-scrutiny.
Furthermore, wherever the “well-being” language could
possibly remain narrowly-tailored to the governmental-interest, such interest
could never be “significant”, and the statute would fail intermediate scrutiny
regardless. The presumed counter-stalking
governmental-interest motivating 633:3-a might be “significant”, but the obsequiously-catering-to-the-epicurean-“comfort”-and-“happiness”-of-a-plaintiff interest (the
only interest to which “well-being” is narrowly-tailored) surely is not.
3.
Alternative Channels
Nor does the legal standard at III-c. appropriate any imaginable alternative manner
a defendant may dare disagree with a plaintiff’s stalking order within his
public-or-third-party communications without suffering greater likelihood of
stalking order extension, where the plaintiff’s “comfort” should be disturbed
by knowing the defendant’s mere contrary opinion.
B. The “Safety
and Well-Being” Language of 633:3-a, III-c. is Impermissibly Vague
“A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two
independent reasons. First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it
authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,732 (2000). Here, the language of RSA
633:3-a, III-c. is unintelligible and so loosely constrained
that arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement thereof is inevitable. Not only is the
term “well-being” too vague, but also the extent to which the preceding term
“safety” narrows or qualifies “well-being”.
i.
Semantic Vagueness
As applied, Paul Maravelias lacks the intelligence to discern
which behaviors are reasonably expected to minimize chances of order extension.
Whether he is simply to obey the order, avoiding/ignoring the Plaintiff as he
has, or must somehow appease her psychological “well-being” by tacitly
congratulating her felony-perjury-fueled legal abuse, is unclear.
Facially, the language creates even worse problems for
trial courts. One judge might think a “well-being” order ridiculous and far in-excess-of
the legislative counter-stalking
intent, calibrating his or her judgements to the statute’s broad “safety”
context, even applying ejusdem generis
to constrain “well-being” thereby. However, another judge might reject this
interpretation, “safety and well-being” not being a list, and adopt the plain
meaning of the word “well-being” as this Court does on review.
ii.
Syntactic Vagueness
The statute is fraught with meaningful syntactic
ambiguity between the co-possible constructions “shall grant such relief as may
be necessary to provide for the (safety and well-being)” and “… relief as may
be necessary to provide for the safety, and (relief as may be necessary to
provide for the) well-being”. The former interpretation begets tautology, the
latter overbroad plaintiff-sycophancy. This tremendous interpretation-dependent
leeway afforded trial courts in applying subsection III-c. sponsors capricious, arbitrary extensions as
perversely fact-amnestic as John Coughlin’s against Maravelias in this case.
The Old Man’s 2003 death was not of natural causes.
From on-high he beheld the land before him. He witnessed not a frugal New
England citizenry of individualist “Live Free or Die” self-reliance, but rather
the infantilistic, progressivist corruption of all for which he stood. He
glanced farther to Boston and envied the dutiful balance of liberty-interest in
Massachusettensian law – embarrassingly, unlike its tyrannical Novahantonian
analog. He contemplated M.G.L. 265 §43, which sensibly necessitates
an actual “threat with the intent to place the person in imminent fear of death
or bodily injury” for “stalking”. Betrayed by his own people, he then beheld
M.G.L. 258E §3(d): the analogous civil
“harassment” order extension standard; for civil “stalking” orders do not exist.
The Commonwealth irrationally-abdicates-not its legitimate counter-harassment governmental-interest, nor embellishes with
flowery “well-being” sophistry. Amazingly, it permits “the court [extend] the [harassment] order … as it deems
necessary to protect the plaintiff from harassment.”
Id. The more-proximate golden dome at
Concord then robbed the Old Man’s gaze. The insidious travesty of RSA 633:3-a, III-c. agonized his senile consciousness. He threw
himself down, ending his own life in ashamed despair: for “death is not the
worst of evils”.[9]
II.
WHERE CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS INCITATIVELY BULLIED PAUL
MARAVELIAS ON HER SOCIAL MEDIA AFTER LAUGHIBLY LYING ABOUT HAVING “FEAR” OF HIM,
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF “REASONABLE FEAR” WAS
INSUFFICIENT
Fortunately for him, the Old Man never lived to see the day
where a New Hampshire trial court would continue criminalizing a young man’s
firearm-ownership because the 17-year-old girl who incitatively targeted and
bullied said citizen with her and her boyfriend’s middle-fingers on social
media claims to “fear” him. Judge John Coughlin’s peppering-in a finding of
“reasonable fear” (A2) was gratuitous under subsection III-c., obviously rooted
upon insufficient evidence, and further indicative of his biased, dismissive judicial
misconduct against Maravelias, days before retirement.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN UNSUSTAINABLE EXERCISE OF
DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE STALKING ORDER EXTENSION
A. Good Cause
for Stalking Order Extension was Not Shown by a Preponderance of Evidence
The trial court’s order is risibly
ludicrous. This stalking order has become an absurd and pointless
self-fulfilling prophecy if Maravelias’s non-Plaintiff-directed speech-acts
decrying the injustice of the “staking” order themselves cause it to be extended.
Analytically,
the logic of the trial court’s order is as follows:
|
Premise #1 |
Paul Maravelias, believing himself falsely accused
of stalking and possessing an audio recording disproving the accusations
sustaining our original stalking order, dared communicate privately to
third-parties, not Christina DePamphilis, about the injustice he believed we did
against him. |
|
Premise #2 |
These private third-party communications of Paul Maravelias protesting his own innocence somehow caused Christina DePamphilis to have “reasonable fear”, even though she only even found-out about them by-accident, and even though she admitted to middle-fingering Maravelias with her new boyfriend on public social media to assert her “independency [sic]” (T74:14,233:8) to Maravelias. |
|
Premise #3 |
Despite Maravelias’s vociferous asseverations to be repulsed by and disinterested in Christina DePamphilis, including his inability to even physically recognize her in the court parking lot and intuition that “she deserves to be [his] girlfriend like Osama bin Laden deserves to be mayor of Manhattan” (T357:14-16), and despite her own attorney’s calling Maravelias’s a “previous obsession” (A36), we are justified to fantasize Maravelias has a “continuing” “obsession” “to this day” (A2) with DePamphilis. |
|
Premise #4 |
We should ignore Maravelias’s evidence of Christina DePamphilis’s extreme falsity, such as the Turkey Trot video, and our in-person comments to Maravelias were lies. (See infra) |
|
Conclusion |
Therefore,
there is “good cause” to extend the stalking protective order. Further, we
include gratuitous, amplified language about a “perverse obsession”, “sole
purpose of harassing/stalking” and “reasonable fear” in our order, because pro se Paul Maravelias knew the law,
dared hold us accountable thereto, and generically pisses us off. |
Premises 2-4 above are false. Any sensible adult having read
the trial court’s order, knowing the facts of this case, would find it illogical,
unsustainable, and simply outrageous. Furthermore:
·
Christina DePamphilis’s relied-upon, obsessively-collected
1.5-year-old photographs of Maravelias’s private home bedroom/office pictured a
pre-stalking-order state,
since Maravelias was living away at college immediately after December 2016. (T447:3-14,455:7-10;A46-47)
·
After Maravelias exposed her innumerable
inconsistencies, willful lies, and false memory, the trial court erred to
attribute a scintilla of credibility to Christina DePamphilis’s
representations, such as relying upon her self-serving assertion she “fears”
Maravelias. (A44)
·
Upon Maravelias’s showing DePamphilis had submitted
countless false-or-otherwise-unfruitful police reports trying to get him
arrested mid-order (T483,A20), the trial court
insensibly failed to dismiss the obvious legal-harassment-purposed “stalking”
order against Maravelias.
·
Given the early-May 2018 phenomenon where Maravelias wrongly
believed the order was annulled and went for a peaceful victory-“walk” instead of contacting the Plaintiff whatsoever (T357:2-5,303:17-22),
only an unscrupulous tyrant like John Coughlin would later libel him an
“obsessed” “stalker” causing “reasonable fear”.
·
If the upheld-extension in MacPherson v. Weiner, ibid., was “a close case” even where the
defendant had actually violated the stalking
order and committed far-less-questionable original acts of “stalking” (not
asking-out a girl once, thereafter eternally ignoring her), then the instant
case miserably fails to even approach warranting extension.
B. The Trial
Court Made Honest Verbal Comments at Trial Proving its Subsequent Written Order
was Shamefully Disingenuous
Judge Coughlin revealed his honest impressions of Maravelias toward
the end of the Hearing, commenting to Maravelias:
“Well, let me ask you, is there any potential that this case could settle?
Because it looked like you’re willing to stay away and not have any contact and
otherwise comply with what is the order.” (T479)
“it appears that you do not want to have any contact and that you’re going
to do that on a voluntary basis.” (T479)
“you indicated that, you don’t want to have anything to do with the
family, you don’t want to have anything to do with this young woman, and you
just want to be left alone and you’re going to leave her alone. At least that’s
my impression” (T480)
Having listened to Maravelias testify, any rational adult would
endorse Judge Coughlin’s candid Billy-Joel-esque
characterization of Maravelias’s pacifist “leave-me-alone” outlook concerning the
Plaintiff and her family. However, seven mere days later in his demented
6/15/18 order, John Coughlin took to a vomitous display of self-contradicting
libel, bullshitting that Maravelias has a “strange, perverse and unhealthy
obsession” with the Plaintiff “which … continues to this day”. (A2)
Additional self-contradictions aliunde in the transcript (T58:7-9,73:13-19,308:12-18,468:19-20) are
likewise indicative that John Coughlin’s 6/15/18 libelous abomination extension
order was about as genuine as the 1919 World Series.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MARAVELIAS’S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS
A. Reversal is
the Necessary Remedy to the Trial Court’s Blatant Violation of the “30 Days”
Hearing Requirement of 633:3-a, III-c.
Given the trial court’s illegal abrogation of Maravelias’s
due-process “right” “to a hearing on the extension of any order under this
paragraph to be held within 30 days of the extension” as mandated by 633:3-a, III-c.., the subsequent stalking
order extension must inescapably be reversed. This Court was abundantly clear
in McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643 (2005) that dismissal of domestic violence petitions
is the required remedy when trial courts fail to obey statutory time-limit requirements.
Such requirements are compellingly necessary to provide defendants a baseline
level of due-process fairness where their basic liberties are at stake.
McCarthy bears striking factual similarity hereto and is
doubtlessly dispositive. Firstly, it was a domestic violence order reversed on
appeal, certainly more serious than a “stalking” order here where Defendant
invited Plaintiff and her mommy on a date while offering her a fancy car, got
rejected, and then never spoke to her ever again. Secondly, the McCarthy trial court scheduled the first
excess-of-30-day-requirement hearing for 9/16/04, 4 days beyond the 30-days-post-10/13/04-petition
date. Here, Maravelias’s rights were repudiated by the stalking order for 9 days after 2/11/18, the date 30-days post-1/12/18-extension.
“Where the legislature, out of liberty interest concerns, has
mandated time limits for holding hearings, we have held that personal jurisdiction
over a defendant is lost, absent waiver, if the case is not heard within the
statutory period.” Id., quoting Appeal
of Martino, 138 N.H. 612 (1994). The
stalking statute is functionally identical to the domestic violence statute in
stipulating the court “shall” obey the time-limit. “Since these hearings are
designed to protect a defendant’s substantive rights, the court’s failure to
hold them must result in dismissal of the domestic violence petition.” McCarthy, ibid. Accordingly, this Court must
reverse the stalking order extension.
B. The Trial Court
Illegally Limited Defendant’s Guaranteed Right to Videotape the Entire Public
Hearing
The trial court
illegally limited Maravelias’s right to videotape the entire proceeding. (T9:1-3;A48)
After Plaintiff objected to Maravelias’s perfunctory videorecording-notice-motion,
the trial court violated Circuit Court Rule 1.4 by formally prohibiting Maravelias from
including the Plaintiff in his videotape of her own public court hearing. (A48,60)
Maravelias objected contemporaneously (T5-7) and post-facto through pleadings (A48,60-64), identifying the further-Plaintiff’s-lying-enabling
prejudicial nature of letting her testify off-camera. Thus, reversal is the
appropriate remedy, exactly as Maravelias presciently apprehended at trial. (T484)
C. The Trial
Court Violated the Statutory Advance Notice Requirement and/or Other
Substantive Due Process Rights
i.
“Obsession” and the 6/8/18 Surprise-Photographs-Exhibit
The trial court erred by relying upon Plaintiff’s unnoticed
surprise-photographs with which she ambushed Maravelias on the hearing’s
last-day to advance an unnoticed allegation of “obsession”, in violation of
173-B:3, I. (A2), applicable to
stalking cases. Both that allegation and the Maravelias-privacy-assaulting bedroom-photographs
themselves were noticed nowhere in Plaintiff’s extension motion. Further, the absurd
“obsession” allegation should have been estopped. (A67-70)
ii.
Ignored Motion to Dismiss
Maravelias invites this Honorable Court to ignore this
paragraph if disagreeing the “good-cause” standard could permit a trial court
to refuse to extend a stalking order because of a subsequent showing it was
predicated on totally-unnoticed, extra-petition allegations, even where said
order won this Court’s obligatory affirmation on the technicality-grounds of
insufficient issue preservation. Maravelias here repeats the facts and
arguments (T487-489) his ignored 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss (A107) rehearsed.
V.
JOHN J. COUGHLIN, THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE, COMMITTED A RAMPANT
SPREE OF BIASED AND UNJUST CONDUCT AGAINST MARAVELIAS, BEING LARGELY
UNACCOUNTABLE TO AUTHORITY, SINCE HE RETIRED DAYS LATER
Taken altogether, Judge Coughlin’s judicial acts from both 2018
Maravelias-DePamphilis cases reveal a consistent pattern of bias and prejudice.
Put lightly, no remotely honest judge would order a stalking-petitioner to pay
his opponent’s itemized expense incurred and dated before said petition was even filed and then utterly ignore the
error after said petitioner’s motion for reconsideration complained thereof
(referencing 2018-0376). Lacking space here to analyze Judge Coughlin’s
abounding even-worse instant-case misconduct, Appellant Maravelias requests
this Court review his recent trial-court-level motion explicating the noted disturbing
phenomena. (A115)
This Court should reverse, as Maravelias was obviously not
given a fair shot.
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S POST-TRIAL
MOTION FOR EXTENDED PROTECTIVE ORDERS
On 7/2/18, Plaintiff motioned for vastly expanded “protective”
orders against Maravelias. (A152) She hoped to criminalize Maravelias’s mere
possessing her “social media” artifacts wherein she bullied and harassed
Maravelias, which indicated her malicious prosecution and bold lack of “fear”
(A154). Maravelias extensively litigated against this outrageous motion in
responsive pleadings (A156), asserting the requested terms’ unconstitutionality
(A161) and illegality (A182).
In predictable fashion, Judge John J. Coughlin, the
natural-rights-calpestating rebel and effeminate, sequacious houseboy-servant to
daddy David’s vindictive lust, scribbled-off his approval. Spineless Coughlin might
as well have prepended his Order, “Don DePamphilis, I am honored and grateful
that you have invited me to your daughter’s restraining order hearing. I will
extend it and grant any further requests. Don DePamphilis, I pledge my
ever-ending loyalty.”
John Coughlin pleasured himself with a last-laugh of
recalcitrant judicial abuse against Maravelias by not even granting Plaintiff’s
concessively amended, slightly-less-overbroad terms proposed in her responsive
7/12/18 pleading (A180,8). Rather, Judge Coughlin ignored Maravelias’s weighty
responsive pleadings and affirmed motu proprio the
irrationally draconian terms in Plaintiff’s original 7/2/18 motion, which even
she was willing to partially ameliorate in light of
Maravelias’s subsequent counterarguments. (A7)
Maravelias’s meritorious legal counterarguments in these pleadings
endured a familiar fate: defenestrated into the wind, ignored insouciantly by
the trial court. Unsurprisingly, Judge Coughlin did not cite a word of legal
authority for his final judicial act against Maravelias. (A6) The temerarious tyrant
did not whim to betray the slightest indication he’d even read Maravelias’s counter-pleadings
at all, wherein Maravelias hopelessly attempted to hold Judge Coughlin
accountable to written laws and constitutions guaranteeing certain rights.
Rather, John Coughlin whored himself on the exhilarating
thrill of his trademark “denied” and “granted” go-to scribblings (A3,4,5,6),
knowing himself sacrosanctly above the law, unobliged to offer a single further
word of justification for ablating Maravelias’s right to possess public court
exhibits profitable to his defense. After all, at that time, September 5th
was just days away. That plump post-retirement pension was so close John Coughlin
could taste it.
That such corrupt court-sponsored further-trampling of
Maravelias’s basic freedom of speech could occur in a nominally free country is
surreal. Judge Coughlin only profaned the public’s memory of his lackluster
career by consummating such cavalier insanity as one of his final judicial
acts. Is Maravelias a criminal for “possessing” “social media exhibits” in this
very brief for his own legal defense?
Maravelias here re-invites this Honorable Court to contemplate
the tragic absurdity that all this is transpired solely because he once invited
a girl to dinner and never once spoke to her after the day she rejected him. (T27,28,35-36,451:17-18)
A. The Trial Court
Transgressed Constitutional Rights and Unsustainably Exercised Discretion
Maravelias satisfactorily explicated the unconstitutionality
and unsustainable improvidence of granting Plaintiff’s motion for expanded
terms in his responsive pleadings thereto (A161-163), especially regarding the
first term prohibiting Maravelias from directly or indirectly “possessing” his
legal abuser’s “social media communications” (A154). In this brief, Maravelias advances
similar arguments against the underlying stalking order extension which are
equally applicable to this separate order granting expanded protective order
terms. Lacking space for repetition thereof, Maravelias here incorporates by
reference those arguments. (A157,182)
B. John J.
Coughlin Personally Committed a Class B Criminal Felony Violation of 641:5,
I.(B) in Granting Plaintiff’s Obscurantist Assault Against Maravelias’s Public
Freedom of Expression
Maravelias respectfully requests this Court address that Judge
Coughlin personally violated a criminal statute in granting the motion, as Maravelias
emphatically forewarned in his objection pleadings in this matter. (A182,183)
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE the foregoing compels the Defendant-Appellant,
Paul Maravelias, humbly to pray this Honorable Court:
I.
Reverse the trial court’s 6/15/18 extension order,
ending this case;
II.
Reverse the trial court’s 8/7/18 order granting further
injunctions; and
III.
Retroactively annul the original stalking order dated
2/7/17, if possible, issuing declaratory relief that it was error to find Paul
Maravelias had ever stalked the daughter of David DePamphilis.
I, Paul Maravelias, certify that
copies of the Derry District Court decisions being appealed are attached
hereto. See N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 16(3)(i).
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
in propria persona
the first
day of november
Paul
J. Maravelias
in the year of our lord mmxviii
34 Mockingbird Hill Road
Windham, New Hampshire 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
(603) 475-3305
CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE AND RULE
16(11) COMPLIANCE
I, Paul Maravelias, hereby certify that on this day were sent
via first-class mail two copies of the within Defendant’s Brief and
accompanying Appendix, postage prepaid, to Simon R. Brown, Esquire, Counsel for
the Plaintiff-Appellee, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. 1318 Concord, New
Hampshire, 03302-1318.
I, Paul Maravelias, hereby certify that this document was not
drafted by a limited-representation attorney. See N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 16(10).
Certification, further, is made of the foregoing document’s
compliance to word-count limitation, 9,493 words being contained, exclusive of
the herein addendum-certificate and of other addenda. See N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 16(11), 26(7).
November 1st,
2018
Paul J. Maravelias
PRAYER FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The Appellant, Paul Maravelias, respectfully requests
Oral Argument before the full court pursuant to Rule 16(h). 15 minutes are
requested.
APPENDIX
Trial
Court Decisions
6/15/18 Order Granting DePamphilis’s Motion to Extend Duration of Final
Stalking Order of Protection......................................................................................................................... A1
Denial of Maravelias’s Motion for Reconsideration........................................................ A3
Denial of Maravelias’s Motion for Discovery.................................................................. A4
Denial of
Maravelias’s Motion to Strike........................................................................... A5
Denial of
Maravelias’s Objection to DePamphilis’s Motion for Further Stalking Order Terms.......................................................................................................................................... A6
8/7/18
Order Granting DePamphilis’s First Motion for Further Stalking Order Terms A7
8/7/18
Order Not Even Granting DePamphilis’s Responsive, Ameliorated Motion for
Further Stalking Order Terms..................................................................................................... A8
1/12/18
Initial Extension of Stalking Order...................................................................... A9
Trial
Court Exhibits
Christina DePamphilis’s 6/21/17 Middle-Finger Provocation Posts Against
Paul Maravelias on Social Media............................................................................................................ A11
Christina DePamphilis’s 6/19/17 Social Media Post With Her Boyfriend
Targeting Maravelias..................................................................................................................... A13
Christina DePamphilis’s 12/12/16 Text Message to Paul Maravelias Showing
She Did Not Have “Fear” of Him..................................................................................................... A14
Evidence of
Christina DePamphilis’s Social Media Accounts Deleted Right Before Hearing....................................................................................................................................... A15
Maravelias’s
April 2018 Statement to WPD About the March 2018 Nasty Letter Sent to David
DePamphilis....................................................................................................... A17
Christina
DePamphilis’s Age-16 “4:43am” Vodka Post............................................... A18
Photograph
of Christina DePamphilis Casually Socializing with Paul Maravelias..... A19
Maravelias’s
January 2018 Memo to WPD Regarding False and Fruitless Stalking-Order-Violation
Accusation.................................................................................................... A20
Maravelias’s
Criminal Complaint Against DePamphilis Perjury and Theodore and Caroline
Maravelias Letter-testimonies On the Contents of Maravelias’s 12/12/16 Audio
Recording They Listened to In Vermont....................................................................................... A24
Excerpt
from Christina DePamphilis’s Attorney’s April 2018 Pleading Alleging Maravelias
Had a “Previous Obsession” With Her....................................................................... A36
May 2018 Nolle Prosequi of Baseless 12/15/17 WPD
Arrest of Maravelias............... A37
Transcript
Excerpt From 1/5/17 Hearing Indicating Christina DePamphilis’s “Turkey Trot”
Accusation Proven False by the Cell-Phone Video.................................................... A38
Excerpt
from Original 12/28/16 Stalking Petition Copy Showing Christina DePamphilis’s
Claims about Being “Stalked” by Maravelias at the 2013 Turkey Trot, Later
Revealed to be a Total Lie by His Sister’s Incidental Cell-Phone Video Thereof,
and Other False Accusations................................................................................................................... A39
Original
Stalking Order
Judge Stephen’s 2/7/17 Stalking Order Finding of Facts Against Maravelias............. A40
Motion
for Reconsideration Litigation
Maravelias’s 6/25/18 Motion for Reconsideration......................................................... A41
DePamphilis’s 7/2/18 Objection...................................................................................... A52
Maravelias’s 7/5/18 Reply to DePamphilis’s 7/2/8 Objection...................................... A58
Maravelias’s 7/5/18 Motion to Strike Part of DePamphilis’s 7/2/8 Objection............. A67
Underlying
Stalking Order Extension Motion
DePamphilis’s 1/5/18 Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of
Protection A72
Maravelias’s 1/18/18 Objection to DePamphilis 1/5/18 Motion to Extend.................. A97
Other
Trial Court Motions
Maravelias’s 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss and Vacate (Redundant Exhibits
Omitted) A107
Maravelias’s 5/29/18 Motion for Discovery................................................................. A110
Maravelias’s 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement.............................................. A115
Transcript
Excerpts of Related Proceedings
Transcript Excerpt from 1/5/17 Hearing Showing “Arm-Grabbing” Lie Against
Maravelias..................................................................................................................................... A150
Transcript Excerpt from 2/15/18 Hearing in Paul Maravelias v. David
DePamphilis Indicating the Trial Court Scheduled That Hearing Before the
Renewal Motion in This Case, Further Violating the 30-Days Requirement.......................................................................... A151
Summer 2018 Post-Extention Litigation on
DePamphilis’s Motion for Expanded Protective Order Terms
DePamphilis’s 7/2/18 Motion to Amend Final Stalking Order of Protection to
Include Further Terms.......................................................................................................................... A152
Maravelias’s 7/5/18 Objection...................................................................................... A156
DePamphilis’s 7/12/18 Reply to Maravelias’s 7/2/8 Objection.................................. A178
Maravelias’s 7/16/18 Reply to DePamphilis’s 7/12/18 Reply and Criminal
Complaint against Christina DePamphilis............................................................................................... A182
Miscellaneous
Maravelias’s 12/23/16 Text Message to David DePamphilis Asking Him to
“Stop Harassing” Maravelias’s Parents.................................................................................................. A197
Transcript Excerpt from the Paul Maravelias v. David DePamphilis
Hearing Indicating the Bad-Faith, Vindictive Provenance of the Stalking Order
in This Case by David DePamphilis’s 2016 “Last Straw” Quote................................................................. A198
Maravelias’s 4/13/18 Reply to DePamphilis’s Brief on Motion for Award of
Attorney’s Fees in Paul Maravelias v. David DePamphilis, Showing Initial
Falsification and Theft-Attempt..................................................................................................................................... A199
Trial Court’s First Notice of Hearing for 2/15/18........................................................ A222
Text
of Relevant Authorities
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated............................................................... A223
General Laws of Massachusetts.................................................................................... A227
New Hampshire Rules of the Circuit Court – District Division.................................. A229
[1] T = Consecutively-numbered transcripts of May-June 2018 trial court Hearing.
A = Appendix herewith.
Example format: (Tx:y-z,a-b;A10-20) where y-z reference lines on transcript page x
and a-b reference whole consecutive transcript pages.
[2]By 2018, DePamphilis falsely portrayed Maravelias as some “spoiled rich kid”, and John Coughlin “ordered” Maravelias to pay his abuser “9,000 dollars” which Maravelias didn’t “even have … in his bank account”, still paying off “2016 taxes”. (T332)
[3] Hurtfully, Judge Stephen’s libelous order-text in this regard appears as Mr. Maravelias’s first public Google search result, being cited in this Court’s 7/28/17 Order in 2017-0139
[4] Appellant has uploaded the video to YouTube, currently in private (unlisted) mode, for this Court to access: https://youtu.be/EAawoOcFGVg
[6] Cf. O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (2012). “Raising the middle finger may constitute fighting words or a true threat.” Id at 429.
[8] Newberg and Waldman, 2012 (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/words-can-change-your-brain/201208/the-most-dangerous-word-in-the-world)
[9] Upon extensive individual research, Appellant cannot find one single other state of comparable protective-order-procedure which magically discards the initial-issuance-standard for something pointlessly different for extension.